China's charm offensive and peacekeeping: the lessons of Cambodia – what now for Sudan? by Hirono, Miwa
This article was downloaded by: [University of Nottingham]
On: 22 March 2014, At: 09:53
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
International Peacekeeping
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/finp20
China's Charm Offensive and
Peacekeeping: The Lessons of
Cambodia – What Now for Sudan?
Miwa Hirono
Published online: 15 Jun 2011.
To cite this article: Miwa Hirono (2011) China's Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The
Lessons of Cambodia – What Now for Sudan?, International Peacekeeping, 18:3, 328-343,
DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2011.563097
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563097
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
 at
 09
:53
 22
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The
Lessons of Cambodia – What Now for Sudan?
MIWA HIRONO
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping is often viewed as a part of a global ‘charm
offensive’ aimed at enhancing China’s image in host countries. However, when viewed
in the light of its support for dictatorial regimes in those host countries, do Chinese peace-
keeping efforts improve the perceptions local populations have of China? This article
examines changes in Cambodian perceptions of China during the UN Transitional Auth-
ority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993. It argues that China’s peacekeeping con-
tribution to UNTAC helped to overcome negative perceptions of that country rooted in its
support of the Khmer Rouge before 1992. The key to overcoming current negative percep-
tions is to project an image of Chinese neutrality with respect to all parties in a civil war.
This article concludes by discussing the implication of this argument with regard to China’s
peacekeeping in Sudan from 2006 to the present, and suggesting that China will need to be
more attentive to the needs of other warring factions in the north–south and Darfur
conflicts.
Introduction: China’s Peacekeeping from Local Perspectives
The politics of image have been important to China for at least the last two
decades. In the 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) engaged in ‘periph-
eral diplomacy’ (zhoubian waijiao, ), seeking a favourable image in
Southeast and East Asia, thereby securing its borders and enabling it to rapidly
develop economically. As China’s rise continued to increase its reach globally
in the 2000s, the government made cautious efforts to project the idea that it
does not threaten the world. These efforts are demonstrated by such policy dis-
courses in China as ‘peaceful development’, ‘harmonious world’, ‘soft power’
and ‘responsible power’. Chinese officials and analysts see peacekeeping as an
important component of its ‘charm offensive’ aimed at enhancing its image in
host countries.1
However, reports indicate that there are problems of distrust between the
Chinese and local populations in several host countries, including Sudan. A repre-
sentative example is the kidnapping of Chinese oil workers in Sudan in October
2008.2 This was a consequence of China’s close relations with the regime in Khar-
toum. In Sudan, China has provided the Khartoum government in the north with
political, security and economic support, including arms used in the north–south
and Darfur conflicts.3 The conflict between the northern and southern regions
persisted over two decades from 1983 to 2005, and resulted in an estimated
two million deaths, four million internally displaced people, and about half a
million refugees.4 In Darfur, the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed
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militia have conducted mass killings and ethnic cleansing since 2003, resulting in
the deaths or disappearances of as many as 200,000 people.5 China’s close
relations with a genocidal regime was not unprecedented. In Cambodia, the
Chinese government provided the Khmer Rouge with political, economic and
military support.6 For three years and nine months (April 1975 to January
1979), the Khmer Rouge carried out the massacre that led to the death of more
than 1.5 million people, no less than a fifth of the Cambodian population, and
the regime forced many others into hard labour.7
When local populations perceive that China is aiding a genocidal regime,
how do they then perceive China’s peacekeeping? Does it help to wipe out nega-
tive impressions and help local peoples to reconstruct a more favourable image
of China? In other words, does China’s ‘charm offensive’ work in complex con-
flicts? This article addresses these questions by examining how local Cambodian
perceptions of China changed as a result of the Chinese peacekeeping contri-
bution to the UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) from
1992 to 1993. The term ‘charm offensive’ began to appear in the literature in
the early 2000s and may not apply directly to the 1992–93 period. However,
the fact that Cambodia was a crucial part of China’s peripheral diplomacy in
the early 1990s, which aimed to gain China a favourable image among local
populations (the same diplomatic objective as China’s ‘charm offensive’ in a
global context in the 2000s), implies that China’s Cambodia policy can be
understood as a precursor to the ‘charm offensive’. The Cambodian case is
chosen because the country has experienced one of the worst genocides in
history, and local populations saw China as a supporter of the dictatorial
regime. Local Cambodian suspicion of the PRC as a prelude to the UNTAC
operation resembles the current case in Sudan, where the Chinese face the
problem of local distrust in southern Sudan and Darfur. Therefore, it is useful
to examine China’s peacekeeping in Cambodia and to consider what that experi-
ence can offer about ways in which the PRC could address the issue of local dis-
trust in southern Sudan and Darfur.
The article argues that, as a result of the peacekeeping operation, China’s
‘charm offensive’ in Cambodia was successful in transforming negative local per-
ceptions of China’s past into more positive ones. This argument comes with an
important caveat. The reason local Cambodians changed their perceptions in
favour of China is not just that the PRC provided infrastructure to facilitate
local Cambodian state-building and economic development – the reason often
assumed in discussion of the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy of peace operation, as
mentioned below. In fact, the more important factor is that China had engaged
in diplomacy with multiple actors prior to the peacekeeping period – it had
close relations with the Khmer Rouge, but simultaneously also with the King
Father Sihanouk, who was a widely respected and still is a popular figure in Cam-
bodia. The approach taken in Cambodia has significant policy implications for
China’s peacekeeping in Sudan in the 2000s onwards. To gain local trust in
areas substantially governed by factions other than the Khartoum government,
China’s diplomacy with Sudan needs to be more neutral, and attentive to the
needs of other warring factions, such as the southern Sudan autonomous
CHINA’S CHARM OFFENSIVE AND PEACEKEEPING 329
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
 at
 09
:53
 22
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
government, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation
Army in Darfur.
The following section begins by briefly discussing the theoretical literature on
local perspectives in peace operations. This is followed by an examination of the
changes in local perceptions of China and of its peacekeeping efforts. The focal
point of the analysis is how local Cambodians perceived China’s apparently
Janus-faced attitude towards their country – supporting a genocidal regime on
the one hand, and contributing to keeping peace on the other. To investigate
local attitudes and perceptions, research was undertaken in Cambodia from
August to September 2009. This consisted of two parts: first, semi-structured
interviews with Cambodian intellectuals, former UNTAC personnel and govern-
ment officials in Phnom Penh (a total of 27), and six local village leaders on
National Road No.6, which Chinese peacekeepers repaired during part of their
mission (from April 1992 to September 1993); and, second, a questionnaire
survey with Cambodian students at the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces’
College of Social Sciences and Languages. This was chosen because it was
expected that Cambodian military officers would have specialized knowledge
of the country’s international military ties, including of the Chinese military con-
tribution to UNTAC. As revealed in more detail later, China’s activities during
UNTAC are not necessarily well known among local Cambodians because
China chose to keep a low profile. However, the images of China among those
who did have the chance to come into contact with Chinese peacekeepers gener-
ate some interesting implications regarding the later discussion of China’s ‘charm
offensive’ project in the context of Sudan in the 2000s. The author carried out a
questionnaire survey among those who were expected to have a better knowledge
of China’s contribution. The questionnaire was structured and its questions for-
mulated on the basis of general Cambodian perceptions of China gathered from
the semi-structured interviews.
Local Perspectives
The peacekeeping literature suggests that local perspectives should be considered
of foremost importance because they relate closely to the legitimacy of peacekeep-
ing operations.8 For example, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines states that
[t]he manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts
itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the
ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peace-
keeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which
it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it
shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with
which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions
of its legitimacy.9
The tendency to pay more attention to local perspectives has increased since
the problematic interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 The International
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Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan attracts much criticism
because of its increasing involvement in counter-insurgency, which has led
to significant civilian casualties and ‘has greatly reduced local support for
ISAF – and with it perceptions of the operation’s legitimacy, both locally
and internationally’.11
In this context, military provision of aid and infrastructure is often understood
as a means to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local people, thereby raising the legiti-
macy of a peacekeeping operation and leading to mission success. For example,
Merriam Mashatt, Maj.-Gen. Daniel Long and James Crum mention that ‘infra-
structure adds “arms and legs” to strategies aimed at winning “hearts and
minds.” Infrastructure is fundamental to moving popular support away from
prewar or during-conflict loyalties and to moving spoilers in favor of postwar pol-
itical objectives’.12 The majority of China’s peacekeepers are military engineers,
and its main peacekeeping contribution can be seen as the building of infrastruc-
ture. Theoretically, therefore, Chinese peacekeeping should be popular among
local populations in operational areas.13
However, as the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan clearly suggest, the pro-
vision of aid and infrastructure does not directly translate into gaining local
trust. Instead, as is often claimed by NGO workers in conflict zones, whether
outside forces can gain local trust depends on how ‘neutral’ local people perceive
them.14 NGOs assert that the ‘shield’ on which they rely to enable them to
operate safely in conflict areas is the neutrality of the organizations and their inde-
pendence in a civil war. This raises significant concerns with regard to China’s
peacekeeping because China was seen as having close relations with dictatorial
regimes – for example, the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and the Omar al-
Bashir government in Sudan.15 For whatever reasons the PRC has supported
these regimes,16 what matters when the PRC attempts to enhance local percep-
tions of China through its peacekeeping activity is the question of how local
populations perceive China’s relationship to the dictatorial regime, and how its
peacekeeping affects such perceptions.
Indeed, the importance of local perceptions informs the pluralist approach to
the study of peace. In part, ‘a crisis of legitimacy’ of the liberal paradigm has led
the study of peacekeeping and peacebuilding to pay more attention to local
agency.17 Oliver Richmond also contends that the ‘universal and hegemonic dis-
course’ of liberal peace has produced peacebuilding failures, and that peace needs
to be ‘contextualised more subtly, geographically, culturally, in terms of identity,
and the evolution of the previous socio-economic polity’.18 In this context, ‘peace’
needs to be researched in terms not only of how it is achieved, but also, more fun-
damentally, of what it means (or what ‘they’ mean if one takes the pluralist notion
of ‘peaces’) and whose peace needs more attention.19 Interdisciplinary perspec-
tives that draw upon sociology, anthropology, human geography and cultural
studies enable one to examine the sources of legitimacy of peace operation
from local perspectives.20
This article is informed by these theoretical studies and complements them by
offering an explanation of why the Cambodians changed their perceptions of
China after the latter’s peacekeeping efforts. As will be discussed below,
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Cambodian perceptions shifted not just because of infrastructures built by
Chinese peacekeepers. More importantly, the shift occurred because of China’s
dual political support in Cambodia. Before I discuss this in more detail, the fol-
lowing section will briefly set the broader political context of China–Cambodia
relations prior to the UNTAC operation in 1992.
China’s Dual Political Support in Cambodia
The PRC has been one of the key actors in Cambodia’s international and domestic
political scene since well before the end of the Cold War. At the time of the
Vietnam conflict (1955–75), Sihanouk was under pressure from China and
North Vietnam to assist their communist forces, and had ceded the northeast
of Cambodia to North Vietnam. The PRC also waged a limited and ineffective
war in early 1979 against Vietnam, which had invaded Cambodia the previous
year, installed a new communist government in Phnom Penh and ousted the
Khmer Rouge from the capital.21
China maintained close relations with two different warring factions in Cam-
bodia simultaneously, one represented by the Khmer Rouge and the other by
Sihanouk. To the Khmer Rouge, China sent political, economic and military
support for nearly two decades from the early 1970s to the end of the 1980s,
including the period in which this faction committed genocide.22 At the same
time, China twice allowed Sihanouk to form a government in exile in Beijing,
and once to seek refuge there.23 Chinese backing of the Khmer Rouge in
Phnom Penh and Sihanouk in Beijing from April 1976 to December 1978 is par-
ticularly interesting, because the two factions opposed each other. When the
Khmer Rouge forced Sihanouk out of office, China gave assistance to the
prince and provided him refuge in China, while supporting the Khmer Rouge
and continuing to be ‘its only link to the outside world’.24
China’s dual political support for both sides continued until 1993, although
military assistance to the Khmer Rouge was severed in 1990. During the peace
process (1988–92) and the UNTAC period (1992–93), China attempted to
sustain Khmer Rouge involvement in the transitional Cambodian government.
It did so despite the Khmer Rouge’s uncooperative attitude to the peace process
and failure to fulfil its commitment to a ceasefire. Most states attempted to
exclude the Khmer Rouge from a national election but China consistently
maintained that the Khmer Rouge should be included. For example, the UN
Security Council resolution 783 on 30 November 1992 stipulated sanctions
against the Khmer Rouge and an election in which all parties but the Khmer
Rouge would take part. China was the only country among the Security
Council’s 15 members that abstained. The Ambassador to the UN, Li Daoyu,
commented in 1992 that sanctions and three-party elections ‘will further
increase differences and sharpen contradictions and could consequently lead
to new, complicated problems in the Cambodian situation’.25 However, by
May 1993 China had completely severed relations with the Khmer Rouge.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the Khmer Rouge offered no apology
to China when it unintentionally killed two Chinese peacekeepers and
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injured four in the Chinese camp at Skun village in Kompong Cham province
on 21 May 1993.26
Cambodian Perspectives on China
Since China had supported the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian people had formed
very negative perceptions of China before UNTAC. These perceptions were
reinforced particularly by a smear campaign against China undertaken by the
Vietnamese-installed government in the 1980s. It disseminated a pamphlet,
Crime of Beijing Chinese Hegemony Enlargement and Servants Pol Pot, Eang
Sary, Khieu Samphan during 1975–1978 [sic], arguing that China had been sup-
porting the Khmer Rouge during the period of genocide. This pamphlet resulted
in the Cambodian population believing that China was actually behind the gen-
ocide.27 Against this background, how did Cambodians perceive China during
and after the period of UNTAC?
As far as Cambodian perceptions are concerned, China’s objective of enhan-
cing its image was met to a limited extent only. Of 27 interviewees in Phnom
Penh, nine were not even aware of the Chinese contribution to UNTAC, even
though most of them were working for, or closely with, UNTAC. The question-
naire survey at the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces’ College of Social Sciences
and Languages also indicates that only 14 out of 48 respondents (29.2 per
cent) were aware that China had contributed military personnel to the UNTAC
mission, despite the author’s initial expectation that military college students
would know more about military-to-military ties with China.
The level of knowledge about China’s participation was very different from,
for example, knowledge about Japan’s participation, though the type and scale
of their respective contributions were similar. Both countries sent engineer
units: two battalions of 400 troops totalling 800 from China, and two battalions
of 600 troops totalling 1,200 from Japan.28 All of the interviewees knew that the
Japanese had made a significant contribution to the UNTAC operation, but more
than half of the interviewees were completely unaware of the role the Chinese had
played in the operation. The other half knew of a Chinese presence, but many had
only vague memories of where the Chinese contingent had worked and what they
had done. Likewise, the loss of two Japanese (UN volunteer Nakata Atsushi and
superintendent Takada Haruyuki) in April and May 1993, respectively, is well
known among Cambodians. However, the loss of two Chinese (Chen Zhiguo
and Yu Shili, both from engineering battalions) in May 1993 is less well known.
The high profile of the Japanese forces, in large part, was derived from having
Akashi Yasushi as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cam-
bodia. Moreover, Japanese foreign policy at that time aimed to make a visible
international contribution.29 In contrast, China’s involvement was invisible
because it did not greatly endeavour to gain publicity about its military presence
in Cambodia. This may relate first to a concern that China’s military presence
might have reminded the Cambodians of the support China had given to the
Khmer Rouge. In fact, ‘keep a low profile’ (tao guang yang hui, ) was
one of China’s broader foreign policy stances in the decade after 1989. This
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policy was formulated by Deng Xiaoping when the West tried to establish a new
world order at the end of the Cold War and China needed to focus on its domestic
economic development while avoiding any perception that it was a challenger in
the new order.30 Its peacekeeping contribution to UNTAC was consistent with
this policy, and was literally obscured ‘beneath blue berets’.
However, the author’s interviews with Cambodian intellectuals and govern-
ment officials who had been directly engaged with the Chinese peacekeepers, or
were aware of the Chinese contribution, reveal a different story. The views
expressed in those interviews have important implications with regard to the
later discussion of Sudan in this article because, by contrast, China in the
2000s wants to be seen globally. It is embarking on a global ‘charm offensive’
to try to reassure the view that China’s rise is benign in nature.
Those Cambodians with a knowledge of Chinese peacekeepers were favour-
ably disposed towards them, owing mainly to the peacekeepers’ diligent work
ethic.31 Furthermore, the Chinese engineering contribution to UNTAC was
invaluable to the overall operation, given that they contributed approximately
19 per cent of UNTAC’s entire engineering troop complement.32 As correctly
suggested by the above-mentioned theoretical literature on the importance of
building infrastructure in peacekeeping, local villagers who lived alongside
national roads repaired by the Chinese peacekeepers also praised them because
they ‘fixed the road very well and I could go to the nearby town more quickly’;
‘they worked effectively and diligently’; ‘they were very friendly and smiling at
us’; and ‘they had good discipline’.33 Some villagers shared favourable stories
of their encounters with the Chinese soldiers. Villagers appreciated their
help, so they would for instance bring them local produce. On another occasion,
Chinese peacekeepers, bored one evening, visited a villager’s house to watch TV
with them. Not all the UN troops were able to create such a popular reputation as
the Chinese peacekeepers. The Bulgarians, for example, were cited as major
offenders, as some of them were reportedly very rude towards local
Cambodians.34
Furthermore, several interviews with villagers along National Road No.6,
which Chinese engineering battalions renovated, revealed more specific examples
of cooperation between the Chinese and local people. This road goes through
Khompon Thom Province, where the Khmer Rouge was still engaging in
attacks against the local population and the police force during the UNTAC
period. The Chinese peacekeepers needed force protection against the Khmer
Rouge, but the UNTAC mandate allowed peacekeepers to use weapons only in
self-defence. Therefore, armed local police and a group of armed villagers gath-
ered to protect the engineers. In interviews villagers expressed their trust in the
Chinese.35 One villager commented that ‘it was great that the Chinese did not
bring weapons other than those to be used for self-defence. If they had done,
that would have created a sense of doubt towards them’.36
Despite the fact that China had supported the Khmer Rouge historically, 24
(out of 33) Cambodian interviewees who knew about the Chinese peacekeepers
tended to be very positive. They were asked how they had developed such positive
views even though they had experienced the terror of the Khmer Rouge’s reign
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and had known that China had earlier supported the Khmer Rouge. Several vil-
lagers suggested that it was because China had close relations with Sihanouk.
The questionnaire survey also reveals the importance of the PRC’s relations
with Sihanouk. Based on the perspectives commonly given by the interviewees,
the questionnaire suggested the following six possible reasons for the PRC to
have contributed its troops to UNTAC: (1) an altruistic view of Cambodia’s
development and stability; (2) to make amends or apologies for what it had
done to Cambodia in the past; (3) to use the opportunity to make economic
inroads into Cambodia; (4) because of close relations with the King Father Siha-
nouk; (5) because of Western pressure after Tiananmen Square in June 1989; and
(6) some other reason. Respondents could choose multiple answers. As Figure 1
indicates, the overwhelming majority (91.3 per cent) chose option 4, the Siha-
nouk factor, as the reason for China’s contribution to UNTAC. From the perspec-
tive of those who survived the genocide, Chinese support for the figure whom they
respected highly was seen as an important prerequisite to China’s ability to build
a relationship with the new Cambodia.
In addition to the Sihanouk factor, another prominent and common view
related to ‘forgiveness’, which ten out of 33 interviewees explained as being a
part of Cambodian culture or religion. They repeatedly stated that Chinese
support for the Khmer Rouge ‘is a story of the past’, and ‘Cambodia is a Buddhist
country. We can forgive others’.37 Such sentiments may have been declaratory
rather than genuine belief, but the theme of forgiveness was consistently
expressed in interviews. Some interviewees even considered that one of the
reasons China sent its peacekeepers to Cambodia was to make amends or apolo-
gize for what it had done in the past. In the questionnaire survey, also, more than
a quarter of respondents chose the option, ‘China wanted to make amends or
apologize for what it had done to Cambodia in the past’ (28.3 per cent). This
FIGURE 1
CAMBODIAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S MOTIVES FOR UNTAC PARTICIPATION
Source: Author’s questionnaire survey conducted at the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces’ College of Social Sciences
and Languages, 2009.
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contrasts with general theoretical observations on the importance of providing
infrastructure for gaining local trust, which ignore local agency and assumes
that local populations are content simply with material benefits. The interviews
and questionnaire survey suggest that an anthropological perspective allows
an exploration of the nature of interactions between local community
members and outsiders, when considering issues around the local distrust of
peacekeepers.38
Another finding from the questionnaire survey is divergence between Cambo-
dian and certain international perceptions of Tiananmen Square as the reason for
China’s deployment of peacekeepers. Some analysts have posited that the most
plausible explanation for China’s participation in UNTAC is that the country
sought to improve its international reputation, which had been severely
damaged by the violent suppression of the demonstrations in Tiananmen
Square.39 However, only 6.5 per cent of respondents chose this as a reason.
In short, important factors that led to the improvement of China’s image are:
first, the PRC’s enduring support for Sihanouk, Cambodia’s legitimate figure-
head; second, the Cambodian interpretation that China came to make amends
or apologize for its past deeds in providing support to the Khmer Rouge, which
Cambodians could forgive; and third (relevant only to those who interacted
with Chinese peacekeepers), Chinese peacekeepers’ diligent work ethic. These
three factors were essential in improving China’s image among Cambodian
local populations.
Implications with Regard to China’s Peacekeeping in Sudan
Approximately two decades have passed since UNTAC operated in Cambodia.
Various changes have taken place in both international and Chinese policies
and practices. Together with increased use of Chapter VII mandates, peacekeep-
ing practices have become more robust and complex. China’s peacekeeping policy
has changed from advocating mere participation in traditional peacekeeping to
engaging in a range of UN peace operations, by taking a more flexible stance in
relation to the notion of sovereignty.40 These operations include peace enforce-
ment in United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from 1993 to
1995, and peace support operations in Liberia, Coˆte d’Ivoire and the Democratic
Republic of Congo among others in the 2000s.41 Chinese diplomacy has also
changed. As mentioned earlier, China’s diplomacy is much more visible, and its
‘charm offensive’ is attracting much more attention in the global politics of the
new century.
However, some important aspects of China’s peacekeeping practices remain
similar to those of the China of 20 years ago. Among these is the practice of pre-
ferring host government consent. No matter how local populations and/or other
states view particularly illegitimate governments, China insists on obtaining host
government consent as a prerequisite for UN Security Council approval of a
peacekeeping operation.42 Therefore, for example, China viewed as necessary
the gaining of endorsement from such dictatorial regimes as the Khmer Rouge
and al-Bashir before it decided to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in
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Cambodia and Sudan. Those local populations that were victims of these dicta-
torial regimes retain deeply ingrained negative impressions of China’s support
for these regimes. China’s peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Sudan are
thus similar in this sense. But a countervailing factor is that, throughout
China’s 20-year involvement in UN peacekeeping, not a single Chinese peace-
keeper has been charged with misconduct, and the Chinese work ethic has been
praised by many policymakers and analysts.43 Based on the above analysis of
Cambodian attitudes towards China, how could the Chinese government and
its peacekeepers gain the trust of local populations in Sudan, and thereby success-
fully carry out a ‘charm offensive’ there?
In Sudan, China is seen as a part of the problem behind two civil wars: one
between Arab northern Sudan and Christian southern Sudan (1983–2005); and
the other between northern Sudan and Darfur (2003 to the present).44 The restric-
tion of oil exports to Western states since the 1980s has led the Sudanese govern-
ment to forge closer relations with China.45 People in southern Sudan regard
China as being too closely linked to the al-Bashir government. China is seen as
focused on obtaining access to oil, and by extension on supporting the Khartoum
government. For that reason, a UN peacekeeper suggested, the Chinese were ‘not
perceived as neutral by some of the population, primarily those of the pro-Suda-
nese People’s Liberation Army’ (SPLA).46
However, the situation has changed in southern Sudan since 2008. China has
been developing closer relations with the semi-autonomous government in
southern Sudan. As the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement sets out, a refer-
endum in southern Sudan was undertaken in January 2011 to decide whether it
would secede from the north to form an independent nation. There are also abun-
dant oil resources in the southern region, and discussion is already underway
between China and Kenya on building a pipeline to Kenyan ports.47 Oil will
not have to go through the Port of Sudan in the north, and this has led China
to reconsider its position in relation to the north–south conflict. In September
2008, China established the Chinese Consulate-General in Juba, the capital of
the southern Sudan region. The Consulate-General has delivered aid directly to
southern Sudan.48 Consul-General Zhang Qingyang met with Riek Machar,
Deputy Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and
Vice-President of the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan in
November 2009 and September 2010, exchanging views on such issues as
strengthening cooperation between the two parties.49 Until 2008, the Chinese
government had regarded the SPLM as a ‘rebel group’, and had not sought to
form any meaningful relationship with it. China has, however, changed its diplo-
matic stance on southern Sudan in order ‘to navigate Sudan’s uncertain political
future’.50
With regard to Darfur, according to a peacekeeper who was stationed at
Nyala in Darfur province in late 2007, the Chinese were particularly concerned
about being targeted by ‘rebels’ in acts of retribution against the Sudanese govern-
ment. Chinese oil investment supported the Khartoum government, and therefore
striking at the Chinese contingent could have been a way of attacking the govern-
ment. Although there has been no such attack, it appears that there is a continuing
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and deep concern among the Chinese peacekeepers that one could occur.51 Unlike
in the case of China’s dual diplomacy in Cambodia and in the north–south conflict
in Sudan, there has been no interaction between Chinese peacekeepers and ‘rebel
groups’ in and around Darfur, such as the JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army.
In October 2007, the JEM attacked the facilities of a Chinese-led business
consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, in the Defra oilfields
in the Kordofan region, and demanded that China withdraw support from the
Sudanese government.52 As Jonathan Holslag states, China’s ‘pure state-centric
approach fails to consider other important actors in the region of Darfur.
A peace mission will need to deal as much with private militias and rebel move-
ments as with regular forces, and neglecting this will constrain its impact’.53
Can China’s peacekeeping presence change perceptions of China as the ‘friend
of a dictatorial regime’, as held by a Darfurian? The Cambodian case suggests
that the answer to this question depends on whether the PRC can maintain its pol-
itical neutrality by supporting multiple actors, including a figure who is seen as
legitimate by local populations, and whether local cultures will facilitate reconci-
liation or forgiveness. Establishing and maintaining relations with more than one
actor does not necessarily mean that China will need to move away from the prin-
ciple of sovereignty. It is possible to establish and maintain relationships with
other actors in a civil war without contradicting that principle. China managed
to maintain relations with both the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk in Cambodia
while adhering to the principle of sovereignty by recognizing only one govern-
ment at a time. After all, the maintaining of relationships can take a variety of
forms. China has been doing this in the southern Sudan, but not in Darfur.
Taking the lessons learned from Cambodia, China could orchestrate engagement
with more than one actor in Darfur, such as the JEM and the Sudanese Liberation
Army. To do so, China would need to reconsider its policy regarding the trade of
arms and oil with the Sudanese government in the north. Once this issue has been
addressed, China could address the issue of reconciliation. How it does so
without losing face will need to be considered deliberately, but as a starting
point, for example, it is meaningful for China to utilize a track two approach
(such as discussions among academics, officials in non-government capacities,
and civil society groups) to make an anthropological enquiry into the ways Suda-
nese local communities view the issue of reconciliation with outsiders.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that China’s ‘charm offensive’ was successful in
that its peacekeeping helped change negative local Cambodian perceptions of
China to more positive ones. The impact of the ‘charm offensive’ vis-a`-vis Cam-
bodian populations was limited due to China’s tao guang yang hui policy at the
end of the Cold War. However, with the change in China’s diplomacy that has an
increasingly high profile, the impact of a Chinese ‘charm offensive’ on Sudanese
local populations has significantly increased.
Observers might expect that Chinese peacekeepers could have gained favour
among local peoples because the peacekeepers consisted mainly of engineering
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units, and because the engineers built social infrastructure such as roads and
bridges – something visible and of direct benefit to the local populations. Con-
trary to such expectation, however, local Cambodian perceptions of China
emerged as positive because the PRC had consistently supported the influential
figure of Sihanouk over time, and because Cambodians had come to ‘forgive’
past Chinese policy apparently because of their socio-cultural background. If
China had supported the Khmer Rouge only, it would have been difficult for
Chinese peacekeepers to win local trust quickly, and to complete their peacekeep-
ing contribution successfully. A Cambodian political culture also appeared to
have helped overcome people’s negative views towards China and led to
forgiveness.
What do the lessons from Cambodia say about how China might consider
policy changes to ensure the success of its peacekeeping operations in Sudan?
First, China’s image as a friend of the al-Bashir government needs to be addressed
in the context of attempting to gain the trust of the local southern Sudanese and
Darfurian people. China’s peacekeeping contribution in Sudan cannot easily be
reconciled with its provision of oil revenue and its arms sales to the Khartoum
government. These are detrimental to the local perceptions of China, and
reinforce the view that China is a friend of the Khartoum government and an
opponent of the local people of southern Sudan and Darfur. The key to
winning local trust is to be neutral in a broader political context and attentive
to the needs of the various actors in the civil war. Local perceptions of China
as a neutral actor in a broader political context have improved in southern
Sudan since 2008. However, more effort is needed to improve local Darfurian
perspectives of China’s neutrality, by balancing between Khartoum and other
actors in the civil war, such as the JEM and the Sudanese Liberation Army.
Once this point is addressed, Chinese scholars and civil society groups could
engage in discussion of the issue of reconciliation from a socio-anthropological
perspective.
This discussion has important implications with regard to China’s government-
oriented diplomacy based on the principle of sovereignty. While UN peacekeeping
is useful for China’s increasingly global ‘charm offensive’, it requires China to take
a sophisticated approach to the principle of sovereignty of host states that are
engaged in civil wars. Being a high-profile power in the twenty-first century,
China can no longer afford to stick simply to the rigid interpretation of sovereignty.
As discussed above in the case of Sudan, doing so inevitably leads to the local per-
ception that China is a friend of the ‘government’, which antagonizes other warring
factions that do not recognize the government’s legitimacy. The sophisticated
approach that China can take relates to how flexible the country can be in applying
the principle of sovereignty to individual cases, by addressing the needs of other
warring factions and maintaining neutrality in a broader political context.
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